Seth Klarman om øverværdering

Citat från Seth Klarmans investerarbrev a 2004:  

"Investors must choose between two alternatives. One is to hold stocks and bonds at the historically high prices that prevail in today’s markets, locking in what would traditionally have been sub-par returns. [...] The alternative is to remain liquid, defy the steady drumbeat of performance pressures, and wait for the prices of at least some securities to drop. (One doesn’t need the entire market to become inexpensive to put significant money to work, just a limited number of securities.) This path also involves risk in that there is no certainty whether or when this will occur; indeed, securities prices could rise further from today’s lofty levels, making the decision to hold cash even more painful.

[...] While we have strong suspicions, it cannot be said with certainty which path will prove wisest. What is clear is that just about everyone will choose the former one. [...] Few are able to look past near-term returns, and today anything appears to offer better returns than cash.  

[...] A corporate management that invested capital at low expected returns just because they had the funds at their disposal and nothing immediately better to do would inevitably arouse investor ire. Why, then, should any investor (hedge fund, mutual fund or individual) always deploy 100% of their capital into marketable securities, applying none of the analytical rigor or intellectual honesty they would demand of the underlying corporate managements? "

Seth Klarman i 2013 års investerarbrev:

"Robert Schiller’s cyclically adjusted P/E valuation is over 25, a level exceeded only three times before – prior to the 1929, 2000 and 2007 market crashes. Indeed, on almost any metric, the U.S. equity market is historically quite expensive. "

Idag består nærmare hælften av Klarmans portfølj av kassa. Vid årsskiftet delade fonden ut øver 10% av kapitalet på grund av bristande investeringsmøjligheter. 

 Seth Klarman fortsætter:

"Six years ago, many investors were way out over their skis. Giant financial institutions were brought to their knees [...] The survivors pledged to themselves that they would forever be more careful, less greedy, less short-term oriented.

But here we are again, mired in a euphoric environment in which some securities have risen in price beyond all reason, where leverage is returning to many markets and asset classes, and where caution seems radical and risk-taking the more prudent course. Not surprisingly, lessons learned in 2008 were only learned temporarily. These are the inevitable cycles of greed and fear, of peaks and troughs.  

Can we say when it will end? No. Can we say that it will end? Yes. And when it ends and the trend reverses, here is what we can say for sure. Few will be ready. Few will be prepared."